Gate 1 criteria and application
The DSS Regulations specify the following types of FMI entity, where they are established in the UK, are eligible to apply to become a sandbox entrant:
- a recognised investment exchange that is not an overseas investment exchange;
- a recognised CSD;
- a person who has a Part 4A permission to operate a MTF and is an investment firm; and
- a person who has a Part 4A permission to operating an OTF and is an investment firm.
The DSS Regulations also allow the regulators to further determine that other persons established in the UK can apply to become a sandbox entrant. Consequently, the regulators propose to open the DSS to persons otherwise specified in the DSS Regulations, to apply to be a sandbox entrant.
The DSS is open to existing financial institutions or new entrants to this market. The regulators are open to applications from firms of all sizes and at all stages of development. However, they must be legal persons established in the UK and obtain the relevant authorisation or permissions before undertaking any regulated activity.
Furthermore, the DSS Regulations give the regulators the power to determine an application process for firms that apply to become a sandbox entrant. While much of the eligibility criteria is already specified by the DSS Regulations, namely the type of entity eligible to apply, the requirement for applicants to be established in the UK, and the FMI activities and financial instruments in scope of the DSS, the regulators can specify the information accompanying the application to determine the eligibility of the applicant.
The regulators propose to require firms to identify the regulatory or legal barriers and/or obstacles to using developing technology such as DLT which prevent them from operating their optimal business model outside of the DSS. This will help focus the DSS on those business models which do need modifications and allow the Government and regulators to better assess what permanent legislative and regulatory changes are needed to allow for a more widespread adoption of these new practices or developing technologies.
The regulators propose to consider the supervisory record of applicants and any past enforcement action taken against them. If the regulators become aware of any adverse information, this information will be taken into account and can result in the rejection of the application. This approach will contribute towards increasing trust in and the reputation of UK financial markets.
The regulators also propose to require a consortium of firms who wish to apply together to operate an FMI within the DSS to establish a single UK entity. The regulators consider this approach to be necessary because the DSS is designed so that only the operator of the FMI needs to become the sandbox entrant, so it would not be practicable for this to be a consortium of firms.
As part of their DSS application, firms should inform the regulators of non-DSS activities they intend to operate from the same entity. Regulators may take this into account when considering the application. During the course of the DSS, if the firm's non-DSS activities change materially, the regulators should be informed.
Proposed approach to rules in the DSS
Background
The DSS Regulations made targeted modifications to Regulation No. 909/2014 (UK CSDR), FSMA 2000, Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 (USRs 2001) and Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). These were made to facilitate the use of developing technology such as DLT for the operation of a trading venue and undertaking the activities of a CSD, and to give the regulators the powers to implement and operate the DSS. A key feature of the DSS Regulations is that some requirements placed on firms in legislation governing CSDs have been disapplied.
Specifically, the DSS Regulations give the regulators the power to make rules applying to sandbox entrants and other persons engaging in DSS activity, but which are not themselves a sandbox entrant (see Regulation 3(4) of the DSS Regulations) as appears necessary or expedient in order to implement and operate the DSS. This includes the power to waive or modify a rule for an individual entity or a class of entity.
Under the modified framework, the regulators have the power to:
- make rules, including to replace requirements placed on firms disapplied by the DSS Regulations;
- waive or modify rules including those made under FSMA 2000 or other relevant enactments;
- provide for the application of existing rules to sandbox entrants of a specified description or for individual sandbox entrants; and
- modify (including the power to provide for them not to apply) technical standards.
This section of the CP explains how regulators propose to use these broad rulemaking powers to operate the DSS.
This breadth of the regulators’ rulemaking powers reflects the need for flexibility in the DSS. The regulators may need to update the regulatory framework as they learn from the activity, technology and business models of sandbox entrants, in order to provide a glidepath to a possible new permanent regime. The regulators may need to temporarily relax certain requirements to allow firms to scale up their operations gradually. Additionally, the regulators may need to adapt rules to specific sandbox entrants to reflect their technology and/or business models, although the bar for this will be high.
The regulators are alive to the possibility that, as sandbox entrants commence live activity in the DSS, they may identify further barriers that prevent them from realising their optimal business models. Firms may approach the regulators in these instances and the barriers identified will be considered on a case-by-case basis. If it is determined that a barrier might be removed while maintaining good regulatory outcomes, the regulators may consider doing so, while not being able to guarantee that this will be carried through to any new future permanent regime.
Bank rules
The Bank proposes to use its flexible rulemaking powers to create ‘Bank’s DSS rules’ which will contain the rules that will apply to DSDs after Gate 2 and the ‘end-state’ rules which are the Bank’s ‘default’ of what it anticipates the future requirements placed on firms may look like. The end-state rules themselves can be found in Appendix B. In addition, please refer to Appendix C for a comparison of the requirements that will apply to firms at Gate 2 and our end-state rules.
The SAN – that will act as a ‘visa’ for firms participating in the DSS – will specify which set of rules apply to DSDs at a given point in time and can also specify any modifications or waivers granted to them by the Bank, alongside other relevant information. By studying the Bank’s DSS rules (alongside the DSS CSDR and DSS USRs) and the SAN of a sandbox entrant, users of a DSD and broader market participants will be able to see the regulatory requirements that individual DSDs are being held to at a particular point in time.
The Bank will reserve the right to make changes to the rules that apply to DSDs across the different stages of the DSS and may vary requirements imposed on individual DSDs as the regulators learn from the DSS. To preserve financial stability, the Bank may choose to tighten the rules for DSDs if it finds there are new risks from the combination of technology and business models in the DSS. Conversely, the Bank may also disapply or make more proportionate certain rules if it finds that risks are lower than anticipated. The Bank will consider any proposed changes to rules carefully and will endeavour to balance the need to create a predictable operating environment for sandbox entrants while continuing to meet its primary objective of protecting financial stability.
The Bank’s approach to creating the end-state rules
The ‘end-state’ rules have been drafted to maintain broadly equivalent regulatory standards as those in CSDR and the USRs. However, where the wording of certain provisions appears to be potentially incompatible with the use of developing technology such as DLT, those provisions have been adapted. The aim of the end-state rules is to shed light on the regulatory standards that will need to be met by DSDs that wish to operate under a possible new permanent regime after the DSS.
As stated above, the DSS Regulations disapplied the requirements placed on firms in CSDR and the requirements placed on issuers and operators of ‘relevant systems’ in the USRs, against which the Bank also supervises CSDs. Using its rule-making powers, the Bank proposes to reinstate the requirements placed on firms into its end-state rules while removing known regulatory barriers to innovation and making some consequential changes, but without diluting the standards in those regulations.
Finally, the Bank proposes to bring across a limited number of the requirements placed on firms that were in the CSDR Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) into Bank rules to maintain the level of detail for those standards where it deems it appropriate. These include RTS for capital requirements and for CSD links (a CSD link is an arrangement between two CSDs that allow clients of one CSD to access and trade securities in another CSD without being a direct participant in both CSDs), whereas the rest of the RTS will be disapplied.
The regulators are unlikely to anticipate all regulatory barriers and novel issues and risks posed by new business models before the DSS opens. This goes to the heart of objectives of the DSS. The Bank can use its powers to continue to evolve the Bank’s DSS rules as it learns from the experience of the DSS, both to remove regulatory barriers and to address new risks from new technologies and business models. By evolving its rules over the life of the DSS, the Bank aims to provide a glidepath for sandbox entrants and market participants towards a possible new permanent regime.
The regulators would expect the Bank’s end-state rules to be modified based on any learnings from the DSS. It should be noted that the FCA is not consulting on its approach to rules under a possible new permanent regime as the industry has not highlighted any required changes to the FCA’s existing regime. There is therefore no guarantee that the end-state rules would apply in their current form to a sandbox entrant that left the DSS at the end of its term. However, the intention is that sandbox entrants which meet the requirements of any new permanent regime would be able to apply to continue activity outside the DSS. The Bank has chosen to consult on the Bank’s DSS rules ahead of the DSS opening. It is possible that the Bank may choose not to do so in future due to the temporary nature of the DSS and for the need for regulators to remain agile. See [Appendix B] for the full end-state rules.
Questions:
4. Are there any known regulatory barriers and/or risks to/from the technology or business models not covered in the end-state rules that the Bank should consider at the outset?
5. Is the full set of rules set out in Appendix B consistent with the objectives and design principles of the DSS? The Bank’s approach to creating the Gate 2 rules
The Bank also proposes to use its powers to put in place modified rules at Gate 2 and Gate 3. At Gate 2, these modified rules will represent fewer requirements than those applied at later stages, reflecting the lower financial stability risk. The limits on the activity of DSDs allow the Bank to temporarily lower regulatory requirements, allowing them to scale their business while maintaining minimum guardrails appropriate to their activity to mitigate financial stability risk. Please refer to Appendix C for a comparison of the requirements that will apply to firms at Gate 2 and our end-state rules. The Bank’s rules in place at Gates 2 and Gate 3 will be lower relative to CSDs operating outside of the DSS, including standards such as those contained in the CPMI IOSCO Principles for Market Infrastructures (PFMI) Opens in a new windowas a consequence of the limits being applied. This means that users of DSDs and wider market participants should expect a higher risk of failure and operational disruption relative to activity outside of the DSS. However, any broader, systemic disruption from DSS activity will be contained as long as DSDs stay within their limits and are able to wind down their DSS activity safely. The Bank will supervise DSDs to achieve this.
The Bank proposes to create Gate 2 rules by:
- Applying some end-state rules in full.
- Disapplying some end-state rules and replacing them with more proportionate Gate 2 rules.
- Disapplying some end-state rules and not replacing at Gate 2 in any form.
While some sandbox entrants may need to make investments or adjustments in order meet Gate 2 requirements, the Bank considers these requirements to be necessary to ensure DSDs meet minimum standards to operate in the DSS. Firms will need to meet Gate 2 requirements in full to conduct live business as a DSD. There may be a limited set of circumstances where firms have identified specific features of their technology and/or business models that will render them unable to meet Gate 2 rules. Firms should provide evidence so that the Bank can consider whether there is a case to vary the way rules apply to an individual firm, including through providing a waiver. The bar for this is likely to be high.
See Appendix B for the full Gate 2 rules.
Questions the Bank is seeking views on in relation to the Gate 2 draft rules:
6. Do you have any feedback on the Bank’s approach to creating the Gate 2 rules or the Gate 2 rules themselves?
7. Are there any specific features of technology and/or business models that would be incompatible with the proposed Gate 2 rules?
Application of Bank, PRA and FCA rules to hybrid entities
One of the objectives of the DSS is to allow firms to experiment with different business models, potentially combining activities that are required to be legally separate under existing legislation, such as the operation of a hybrid entity to provide for the trade and settlement of securities.
It is also possible that a bank applies to participate in the DSS with the intention of continuing its existing banking activities alongside operating a DSD or hybrid entity as described above, without creating a separate entity to undertake DSS activities. UK CSDR prevents the comingling of commercial banking activities with CSD activities, requiring instead a stand-alone banking entity to be set up which undertakes only banking activities for the CSD. The Bank is proposing to disapply the relevant requirements at Gate 2 to allow this comingling. In the interest of clarity, the Bank is only proposing to relax this requirement at Gate 2 where activity is subject to strict limits – the requirement to separate regular banking activities from CSD banking activities remains in place at end-state. This creates another potential area of overlap between Bank’s DSS rules and the PRA regulatory framework for banks (which includes PRA rules).
The regulators are aware that in some cases there may be overlaps across the different regimes which apply to a sandbox entrant. The regulators recognise that firms may have questions about how the different rules that apply to them will interact and encourage such firms to discuss these questions with them at the early stages.
Sandbox entrants will be required to meet all applicable rules and/or requirements relating to the regulated activities they undertake, whether within or outside the DSS. The Bank’s DSS rules will apply to sandbox entrants that are (i) DSD-only and (ii) a hybrid entity in so far as it concerns being a DSD. The Bank’s DSS rules apply only to activities undertaken in the DSS and not to any activity outside of it. In general, the scope of the Bank’s rules is limited to a DSD’s activities of notary, settlement, and maintenance. However, the Bank proposes that the scope of the rule on capital (Article 47 in draft Bank’s DSS Rules) is broadened to ensure that sandbox entrants take account of all activities that take place inside the DSS in the capital calculation.
Subject to the above, the regulators’ intention is to ensure that requirements are proportionate to the risks and to avoid introducing any duplication of requirements because of firms’ participation in the DSS. For instance, sandbox entrants may already be meeting specific regulatory and supervisory outcomes relating to the DSS through ongoing compliance with requirements that apply to their other regulated activities. In such instances, the regulators have powers to waive or modify rules that apply to a sandbox entrant on a case-by-case basis.
Questions:
8. Are there any requirements in the proposed Bank’s DSS rules which would conflict with the frameworks that govern a firm which is also regulated by the FCA and/or the PRA?
9. Do you agree with the proposed approach to managing potential interactions between Bank, FCA and PRA requirements?
Approach to capital requirements in the DSS
To pass Gate 2 and commence live activity, all sandbox entrants will have to hold sufficient resources to cover the risks of participating in the DSS. The requirements a sandbox entrant must meet will depend on its business model and the activities it proposes to undertake.
Bank’s capital requirement for DSDs
DSDs will be required to comply with the Bank’s DSS rules relating to capital requirements. Article 47 in its end-state form contained in the Bank’s DSS rules is in line with current requirements that CSDs must meet under Article 47 of UK CSDR, including the associated Regulatory Technical Standards that provide the detailed requirements for calculating both going-concern capital and the wind down costs.
However, at Gate 2, Article 47 will be less prescriptive relative to the end-state. While DSDs may choose to use the methodology prescribed in the end-state rules, they will also be able to use their own approaches and assumptions to calculate the level of capital they are required to hold at Gate 2 as set out in Article 47. This level of capital should be sufficient at all times to cover the main risks arising from their DSS activity when a going concern and to wind down their DSS activities in an orderly way. The Bank does not propose to prescribe a methodology for this calculation at Gate 2 but will review firms’ approaches and use these as input in determining the appropriate requirements.
The Bank proposes that at Gate 2, as a minimum, DSDs hold the higher of: (a) the amount of resources needed to cover all their going concern risks and the cost of wind down or (b) resources equivalent to at least nine months’ operating expenses for their DSS activities at all times, in order to cover the risks from these activities.
Consistent with the principles set out above, a DSD which is also subject to FCA or PRA capital requirements due to other regulated activity will need to meet both the applicable FCA/PRA requirements and the Bank’s DSS rules on capital requirements for its DSS activities. The regulators’ intention is that a sandbox entrant holds sufficient capital to cover both the going concern risks and the cost of winding down all its activities in the DSS, and, in addition, to satisfy its requirements for any regulated activity outside of the DSS (where relevant). This will ensure that the sandbox entrant can operate safely in the normal course of business and provide for an orderly wind down of all DSS activities if the circumstances required. The regulators will also have the powers to waive or modify Bank’s DSS rules on a case-by-case basis if they create unforeseen disproportionate interactions with other capital requirements. The regulators will look to ensure that firms’ requirements are proportionate to the risks from DSS activities while aiming to avoid double counting of capital.
Questions:
10. Do you agree with the Bank’s proposed capital requirements for DSDs, both at Gate 2 and end state?
11. Do you agree with the proposed approach to capital requirements where firms are also subject to other prudential regimes?